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CEPAL REVIEW No. 20 
The external debt 
and the financial 
problems of 
Latin America 
Carlos Massad 
The external debt is perhaps the most striking man-
ifestation of the crisis through which the countries of 
Latin America are passing and is one of the problems 
whose solution is a necessary condition in order for 
these countries to be able to emerge from their pre-
sent predicament. 
The article begins by presenting some general 
data on the evolution of the total debt in the last de-
cade to its present critical level equivalent to some 
30% of the gross domestic product. It goes on to 
examine the reasons for this increase, dealing with 
them in terms of the increases in the supply of exter-
nal credits and the demand for them, and placing 
particular emphasis in this respect on changes in rela-
tive domestic prices, exchange policy, excessive public 
and private spending, the rise in oil prices and its im-
pact on international liquidity, etc. The author then 
goes on to deal with some consequences of the in-
crease in the debt —such as restrictions on domestic 
policy, the transfer of resources abroad and external 
vulnerability— and the conditions on which this debt 
could be tolerable. These conditions are, essentially, 
the sustained growth of the world economy, con-
tinuity of the flow of external credit, and the expan-
sion of exports, none of which are being fulfilled at 
present. He therefore suggests some emergency 
measures, including in particular the equitable re-
negotiation of the debt between debtors and cred-
itors, an increase in the resources of the IMF and in 
its influence over creditor countries, and an increase 
in international liquidity, concluding that these mea-
sures, together with others in the medium term, are 
an urgent necessity at the present time. 
*A preliminary version of this article was used by ,• 
the author at the lecture he gavç at the National Academy of 
Economics of Uruguay in May 1983. 
"The author is Co-ordinator of a joint UNDP/EC I, A 
project and Professor of the Department of Economics of the 
University of Santiago, Chile. 
I 
Introduction 
The external debt is a subject which is very 
much in fashion, and for this reason it is very 
dangerous: readers probably know just as much 
about it as the author, if not more. We all of us 
read, talk and are well informed on subjects of 
this type, and above all we sometimes hold very 
clear and well-defined ideas on them. I shall try 
to sum up these clear and welt-defined ideas in 
order to give you the perspective at which my 
own experience and work have enabled me to 
arrive. 
I shall refer first of all to the broad mag-
nitudes involved in the financial problems of 
Latin America, then to the increase in the Latin 
American external debt and the reasons why 
this debt has gone up, after which I shall deal 
with the consequences of the increase in indebt-
edness and analyse the question of whether 
this debt is sustainable or not at its present level. 
Finally, I shall put forward some emergency 
and medium-term solutions at both the national 
and international levels and outline the pros-
pects for the near future. 
II 
The magnitudes involved 
Let us first look at the magnitudes involved in 
the Latin American financial problem. It is well 
known that there is a sharp and growing deficit 
on the region's balance-of-payments current ac-
count, that is to say, essentially on our purchases 
from and sales to the exterior, plus payments in 
respect of interests and tourism. For 18 non-oil-
exporting countries, this deficit, which was 
around US$ 2 billion in 1970, kept within the 
range of 10 digits until 1978, when it came to 
some US$ 8 billion, but the following year it 
rose to US$ 14 billion, and in 1981 it reached a 
peak of US$ 27 billion. In other words, over a 
period of 11 years the external deficit on the 
current account of the 18 non-oil-exporting 
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countries increased by a factor of 13, from 
US$ 2 billion to US$ 27 billion. 
Income on the capital account helped to fi-
nance this deficit, however: although on the one 
hand there was a deficit on the current account, 
since Latin America was buying more than it 
was selling, on the other hand this was financed 
with net income on the capital account. This in-
come was consistently greater than the deficit on 
current account, so that it was possible to pay off 
this deficit and still accumulate reserves. Thus, 
for example, whereas in 1970 there was a cur-
rent account deficit of US$ 2 100 million, the 
surplus p n the capital account was US$ 2 800 
million, so that there were US$ 700 million left 
to improve the reserve position of this group of 
countries. This situation continued until 1979, 
when the current account deficit came to 
US$ 14 billion, whereas the capital account 
surplus was US$ 17 800 million. In 1980 and 
1981, but above all in 1982, however, the situa-
tion was completely reversed, and in these three 
years the accumulated current account deficit 
was almost US$ 15 billion more than the net in-
flow of capital, thus meaning a loss of reserves 
by our countries, since only part of the current 
account deficit could be financed with capital in-
come and the remainder had to be covered by 
making use of our own reserves. In 1982, for 
example, there was a current account deficit of 
US$ 25 billion, whereas the capital account 
surplus was only US$ 16 700 million: that is to 
say, in that year alone there was net depletion of 
the reserves by almost US$ 9 billion. 
This inflow of capital comes basically from 
two sources: on the one hand, from direct for-
eign investment, which does not generate in-
debtedness; and on the other hand, from 
medium- and long-term foreign loans, which 
are accounted as such in the balance of pay-
ments. 
While the debt grew, foreign investment 
was becoming less and less substantial. There 
are many reasons for this: on the one hand, very 
good investment opportunities arose in other 
countries, as for example in Asia (Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, and now also Thailand, inter 
alia); on the other hand, it must be recalled that 
between the mid-1960s and perhaps the mid-
1970s in Latin America there was a wave of 
nationalizations in most of the countries, in 
which foreign investments were expropriated. 
In some cases these nationalizations took place 
on account of the excesses of investors, whereas 
in others the motives were different. But the 
mere fact that nationalization took place, what-
ever its cause and almost regardless of the com-
pensation paid, led to the discouragement of 
new investment. Consequently, the inflow of 
capital was increasingly acquiring the nature of 
straightforward indebtedness. 
In order to gain an idea of the level of the 
debt, it may be compared with the total product 
of the countries. Latin America's total debt is at 
the present moment something over US$ 300 
billion. In 1970, the total public and private 
short-, medium- and long-term external debt 
was equivalent to only a little under 12% of 
Latin America's gross domestic product, but to-
wards the end of 1982 it was equivalent to 
around 30% of the product. 
Furthermore, in proportion as the debt 
grew there was necessarily also an increase in 
the cost of servicing it, particularly as regards 
payments of interest, which grew for two 
reasons: because the level of indebtedness was 
rising, and also because interest rates rose sharp-
ly during this period. Expressed as a propor-
tion of exports of goods and services, interest 
payments represented around 7% in 1970, but 
at the end of 1982 they came to almost 40%: 
that is to say, in 1982 it was necessary to use al-
most 40% of the resources obtained from our 
exports simply in order to pay the interest on 
the debt. 
The figures thus show that the debt grew 
rapidly and that its cost is high. We must now 
ask ourselves why the debt increased: what hap-
pened in those 12 or 13 years to make it grow so 
rapidly. 
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III 
Why the debt increased 
Let us classify the reasons for the increase in the 
debt under two traditional categories of 
economic analysis: demand and supply. First of 
all we will see what happened on the demand 
side to cause the growth of the debt, and then 
what reasons there were on the supply side for 
its increase. 
1. The reasons on the demand side 
Various reasons of different types may be men-
tioned on the demand side: the first to be refer-
red to are the domestic policies or events which 
increased real domestic interest rates, for when 
these rates increase, there is a greater incentive 
to seek loans abroad. Consequently, any ele-
ment which helps to bring about an increase in 
real domestic interest rates automatically results 
in a greater incentive to seek loans abroad. 
a) The anti-inflation campaign 
and economic changes 
The first element to be noted here is the 
struggle against inflation. Practically all the 
countries of the region carried on an active cam-
paign against inflation during this period. Such 
a struggle naturally means, among other things, 
a relatively restrictive monetary policy, and this 
in turn brings about an increase in interest rates. 
At the same time, during this period most 
of the countries of the region embarked on poli-
cies of profound economic change in which they 
reviewed their tariffs or financial systems, gen-
eral incentives, systems of taxation, social secu-
rity, etc. 
These policies of change not only have 
long-term effects, but also certain short-term 
effects which may also involve costs. Thus, for 
example, a policy of change normally brings 
about variations in relative prices, which are the 
indicators used by the economy in allocating its 
resources. 
In the case of those goods whose relative 
prices rise, the situation is often resolved by way 
of external trade. If there is a greater demand 
for certain products which causes their relative 
price to rise, then this rise will probably be at-
tenuated by way of external trade, because a 
sufficient amount of those products will be im-
ported to satisfy demand or at least relieve the 
excess demand generated. In the case of a drop 
in relative prices, however, which would repre-
sent a sign that resources should be taken away 
from that activity and transferred to others 
where the prices are more favourable, the effect 
does not take place as rapidly, since the normal 
reaction of enterprises is not to immediately re-
duce their activities, but rather to ask for loans 
from the banking system in order in this way to 
overcome what they consider to be a temporary 
unfavourable situation, although in reality it 
may be a question of a longer-term change in 
relative prices in the country. 
As enterprises approach the banking sys-
tem, this system will respond —if they have ap-
propriate guarantees— by granting them credit, 
and in this way the demand for credit will be in-
creased. On the other hand, those enterprises 
whose relative prices are increasing will also 
want to expand and will then exert pressure on 
the banking system too, so that an abrupt 
change in relative prices in an economy nor-
mally brings with it an acceleration in the de-
mand for credit, that is to say, greater pressure 
on the banking system. This pressure in turn 
will have the result of causing a rise in interest 
rates within the context of a given monetary pol-
icy. Indeed, it may be noted that it is precisely in 
those countries where there has been the biggest 
effort to make changes that there have also been 
the biggest rises in real interest rates. When 
such higher real domestic interest rates exist, 
this naturally constitutes a strong incentive to 
seek loans abroad, where rates are more favour-
able. 
In this way, policies aimed at economic 
change tend, in the short term, to increase the 
demand for credit and to generate high domes-
tic interest rates. 
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b) The link between financial 
and non-financial enterprises 
Within this same field, we must consider 
the fact that in certain cases a link is formed be-
tween the bank and the enterprise making use 
of credit; the enterprise obtains credit in prefer-
ence to other enterprises, and it can therefore 
work with relatively smaller capital in relation to 
its debt. In other words, the enterprise risks 
very little: the smaller the capital is in relation to 
the debt, the smaller the amount risked by the 
enterprise, and if it is only risking a small 
amount, then it will be willing to pay higher in-
terest rates in order to procure financing to 
keep in business, even at difficult times. Thus 
the fact that there is a link between the banking 
system and the production sector gives rise to an 
incentive to enterprises to accept higher interest 
rates than they would otherwise be willing to 
agree to. As is only natural, this once again gen-
erates higher domestic interest rates and incen-
tives for seeking loans abroad. 
c) Exchange policy 
Another important element in this picture 
is exchange policy. If, in a country suffering 
from inflation, the exchange rate is fixed at a 
certain nominal rate and remains stable while 
inflation continues, what will happen is that the 
nominal domestic rates, which are already high 
because of inflation, will be converted into high 
real interest rates in dollar terms. For example, 
if there is a fixed exchange rate for the dollar, 
with inflation of 20% and an interest rate of 
25%, this means that the real rate of interest, 
measured in terms of national currency, is only 
5%, whereas its equivalent in terms of dollars 
would be 25%, because the exchange rate for 
the dollar is fixed. Consequently, if it is possible 
to obtain loans abroad in dollars at an interest 
rate of 12%, this would be equivalent to paying 
only half the domestic rate and hence, in an 
economy suffering from inflation, the fact of 
keeping the exchange rate stable for a long 
period is a further incentive to seek loans 
abroad, because the dollar interest is lower than 
the domestic real interest rate. 
All these elements help to increase the 
domestic real interest rate and tend to generate 
an incentive to seek loans abroad. 
d) Excessive public sector spending 
A second set of elements which explains 
the demand for external indebtedness is linked 
with the elimination of restrictions on expendi-
ture. Here, the orthodox or classic case is that in 
which the government spends more than its in-
come. The following is a typical example: there 
is a fiscal deficit financed by the Central Bank; 
the excess monetary emission generates an ex-
cess of money supply over demand; and this 
excess of money supply is manifested in the 
rest of the markets through excess demand 
for goods and securities. The excess demand 
for goods corresponds to a deficit on the 
current account of the balance of pay-
ments, while the excess demand for securities 
has its counterpart in an outflow of capital from 
the country, so that in turn it is reflected in a 
deficit on the capital account of the balance of 
payments. A global deficit is thus produced 
which the authorities have to finance. Excessive 
public spending, then, financed by emission by 
the Central Bank, means a loss of foreign ex-
change and the State has to go outside the coun-
try, normally through the Central Bank, in 
order to obtain the resources needed to finance 
this deficit. This is where the phenomenon 
known in the United States as 'crowding out' 
takes place: that is to say, when the State goes 
out looking for loans it pushes the private sector 
aside into a corner and the latter sector is not 
able to obtain the credits it needs. Such is the 
traditional or orthodox case. 
e) Excessive private sector spending 
It also seems appropriate, however, to 
briefly analyse some non-traditional or what we 
might call heterodox cases, where the 'crowding 
out' takes place in the opposite direction: here, 
it is the private sector which crowds out the pub-
lic sector. Let us look at an example. Suppose 
that for some reason the private sector decides 
to increase its expenditure and finds possibilities 
of financing this increased expenditure abroad. 
The increase in private spending will then be re-
flected in a deficit on the current account, since 
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the private sector seeks to buy more goods than 
are available in the market and must therefore 
import the additional goods. A deficit is caused 
on the current account, and this is automatically 
financed because the private sector itself seeks 
the necessary financing for its excess spending 
abroad. It might happen, however, that not all 
this financing goes to buy imported goods, but 
part of it is also used to buy domestic products, 
so that in this case part of the financing obtained 
would cover the current account, while the rest 
would increase the country's reserves. 
Thus, through excessive private spending, 
a phenomenon of current account imbalance 
and external indebtedness is created which is 
identical to that occurring in the case of the pub-
lic sector. Where there are possibilities of fi-
nancing it abroad, excessive private sector 
spending can be just as dangerous as excessive 
public sector spending financed from the re-
sources of the Central Bank. 
The increase in the external debt in order 
to finance private spending will be reflected in 
the statistics, and it is probably to be expected 
that in those countries where the increase in the 
debt was due above all to excessive private 
spending, the external debt or the increase in it 
will be fundamentally of a private nature. In 
contrast, in those countries where the increased 
expenditure was due basically to excessive pub-
lic spending, it is the Central Bank or the gov-
ernment itself which will have to seek financing, 
and consequently the external debt or the in-
crease in it will be mainly of a public nature. If 
we look at the statistics of those countries which 
observe 'good conduct' in fiscal matters in the 
traditional sense of maintaining a relatively bal-
anced budget, but where there is excessive pri-
vate spending, we will mainly find an increase in 
the external debt of the private sector, whereas 
in those cases where the fiscal deficit predomi-
nates, it will be seen that the increase in indebt-
edness is essentially public. 
In cases where there is an imbalance on the 
current account due to an increase in private ex-
penditure financed from inflows of capital, then 
if part of these dollars is not used to finance im-
port but to finance domestic expenditure, the 
prices of the so-called 'non-tradeable' goods will 
tend to go up, meaning that in reality the ex-
change rate is lagging behind. We thus observe 
that there is an increase in the debt and that, by 
lagging behind, the exchange rate accentuates 
the current account imbalance. We then have a 
phenomenon where excessive private spending, 
financed by indebtedness which increases the 
reserves but leaves the exchange rate lagging 
behind, will again increase the imbalance on 
current account. 
2. Reasons on the supply side 
Let us leave aside at this point the reasons on the 
demand side which explain the indebtedness 
and look for a moment at the reasons on the 
supply side which show how this high indebted-
ness was able to take place. 
The elements on the supply side are basi-
cally linked with the two 'impacts' of the oil price 
rises. These two great increases, in 1973-1974 
and in 1978-1979, generated enormous 
surpluses on the accounts of the oil-exporting 
countries. These surpluses affected both the 
supply of funds and the demand for them. On 
the one hand, they generated a supply of funds, 
since the oil-exporting countries, especially 
those of the Middle East, have a great prefer-
ence for liquidity in their holdings of foreign as-
sets and they have preferred to put their liquid 
resources in bank accounts rather than in other 
types of investments, especially at the beginning 
of this process. At the same time that these 
countries were depositing these resources in the 
banking system, however, the oil-importing 
countries needed to finance their accounts, 
which had been unbalanced by the deficit. 
There were thus simultaneous increases in 
both the supply of funds in the international 
field and in the demand for them. The oil-ex-
porting countries deposited these resources in 
the private banking system operating at the in-
ternational level, and this system expanded with 
striking speed. For a moment, it seemed that the 
system would not be capable of achieving the so-
called 'recycling', that is to say, the reallocation 
of the funds from the oil-exporting countries to 
the oil-importing countries, yet this recycling 
grew between 1970 and 1981 at an annual rate 
of 20%. Almost all the available indicators, 
whether regarding the total assets of the inter-
national private banking system, its external as-
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sets or its foreign exchange assets, show growth 
rate averages of 20% per year. 
The surplus accumulated by the oil-ex-
porting countries between 1974 and 1981 came 
to US$ 433 billion, while the total net external 
assets of the banks reporting to the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements in Basle are of the order 
of one million dollars. 
With these resources, the Euromarkets ex-
panded rapidly, at an average of 20% per year; 
the European banks expanded by 18%, the 
Eurocurrency market by 19%, the total assets of 
Let us now look at the consequences of the in-
crease in indebtedness, the main figures for 
which we gave earlier, In order to analyse them, 
we should perhaps think in terms of an enter-
prise facing its banker. Let us assume that it is a 
solvent enterprise dealing with a banker with 
whom it has been working for many years, but 
that it now has a relatively high level of in-
debtedness. It is possible that in these cir-
cumstances the banker may say that before the 
enterprise undertakes new investments or ex-
pansion programmes, it should inform him in 
detail regarding its situation, because since it has 
quite a high level of indebtedness it is com-
promising a high proportion of the bank's re-
sources, so that the bank is beginning to take a 
very close interest in the enterprise's evolution 
and risks. 
From the point of view of a country, this 
means that certain restrictions on domestic poli-
cies come into being through the mere fact of 
having a large debt which has to be continually 
renewed. We may recall in passing that debts 
now have much shorter maturities than they 
had ten years ago, because they are mainly from 
private and not official sources. Ten years ago, 
most of the Latin American debt —perhaps 
80% of the total— came from institutions like 
the World Bank, the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, AID, etc.: all official institutions 
which loan for long periods at fixed interest 
the banks reporting to the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements in Basle by 21.5%, etc.; all 
these rates of similar magnitude point to an un-
precedented expansion in external financing. 
Thus, on the one hand, our countries 
found themselves needing more resources, 
while on the other hand they had greater re-
sources available to them: indeed, many foreign 
banks offered loans even when traditionally 
they would have taken the opposite view. This 
custom was reversed in the following years, 
however. 
rates. Now, however, the relationship has been 
completely reversed: 80% of the debt is with pri-
vate institutions which, by their very nature, 
loan for shorter periods and at floating interest 
rates whose consequences we shall analyse later. 
1. The restrictions on domestic policy 
In the first place, the level of the debt imposes 
certain restrictions on domestic policy. Obvi-
ously, it is not possible to apply whatever policy 
one likes: the policies must be such as to make 
possible the regular renewal of at least the level 
of credit already received, and this imposes re-
strictions on monetary, exchange and interest 
rate policies; it is not that these restrictions are 
directly imposed by the creditor banks, but they 
result from the force of circumstances, since the 
banks are looking at certain indicators to decide 
whether the economic management of a coun-
try will allow it to pay its commitments or not: if 
these indicators give a negative answer to this 
question, the bank will become very reluctant to 
renew its commitments and will begin to de-
mand payment or increase the guarantees re-
quested, just as it would do if it were dealing 
with an enterprise; in contrast, if these indi-
cators give favourable answers, the bank will 
probably prove to be quite willing to grant new 
credits, to renew existing ones, etc. It is worth 
repeating that it is not a question of the bank 
IV 
The consequences of the increase in indebtedness 
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making direct demands to the authorities, but 
rather that the banks take into account the way 
certain indicators are evolving. For example, if 
the international reserves are going down, this is 
a bad sign to the bank, and if a country has a 
very large debt it can therefore hardly apply 
policies which involve the reduction of its re-
serves. The banks also consider the situation of 
the balance-of-payments current account: if 
this shows much of a deficit, it will be more diffi-
cult to renew credits or obtain new ones. In 
short, countries must seek policies which do not 
give rise to excessively large deficits on their 
current accounts. These are just a few examples, 
since the range of possibilities is very wide. At all 
events, the main point which I wish to bring out 
is that a high level of indebtedness, by its very 
nature, imposes restrictions on domestic policies 
and it is only possible to apply those which cause 
the indicators of solvency examined with such 
care by the banks to move in favourable direc-
tions which will make it possible to renew credits 
or obtain new ones. 
2. The real transfer of resources 
to the exterior 
A second consequence of a large debt is that it 
makes a real transfer of resources to the ex-
terior a definite probability. Asking for loans 
means obtaining more resources than one pos-
sesses; a country which asks for loans does so in 
order to spend more than it has. In this way, a 
loan from abroad means a real transfer of re-
sources from the exterior to the debtor country. 
At the same time, however, when the debt is 
paid back to the exterior the real transfer of re-
sources is reversed. Transferring real resources 
means having fewer shoes, less clothing, less 
food: it is not something vague but something 
very concrete and effective; transferring real re-
sources to the exterior means sending abroad 
assets which are then no longer available for 
consumption within the country, just as assets 
were received from the exterior when a loan was 
obtained. The developing countries are tradi-
tionally recipients of capital, however, and by 
the nature of their development they are in a 
position to offer better investment conditions or 
terms than others, so that for a very long time 
they will be receiving net capital from the ex-
terior, that is to say, real resources which are 
added to their own, in order to keep up levels of 
consumption and investment. 
When the debt becomes very high, a coun-
try runs the imminent risk that the debt will 
have to be reduced, and this means that there 
will have to be domestic restrictions in order to 
send to the exterior the real resources with 
which the debt is paid. 
Furthermore, the higher the debt, the 
higher too will be the interest, and this forms 
part of the current payments of a country, so 
that the greater the debt, the greater the proba-
bility will be of a deficit on current account due 
to the interest payments, and consequently 
there will also be greater probability that it will 
not be possible to obtain as many loans as before 
and that it will be necessary to transfer resources 
to the exterior. To take an example, let us as-
sume that the external debt of a country is equal 
to its national product, that this product is grow-
ing at a rate of 5% per year, and that the real in-
terest on the debt is also 5% per year; this would 
mean that the country would have to pay to the 
exterior real resources equivalent to the entire 
growth of its economy for ever, since these are 
payments of interest and not of capital. 
3. A new source of external vulnerability 
Furthermore, and as a consequence of the rapid 
growth of the debt, this has been contracted for 
shorter terms, because the commercial banks 
lend for shorter periods than AID or IDB, and 
also at higher costs, because they must not only 
cover their costs but also make a profit. Since 
the debt is for a shorter term and is more 
costly, this increases the possibility of a real 
transfer of resources to the exterior when the 
countries have to pay interest or pay back the 
capital of the debt itself. What makes the situa-
tion even more complex, however, is that the in-
terest on private debts is not fixed like that on 
loans from IDB or AID, but floating, that is to 
say, it is usually varied every three or six months 
in line with the market. This means that the ef-
fects of the interest rate do not fall only on new 
loans. When a rate is fixed —9%, for example— 
and afterwards the rate is raised to 10%, this 
does not increase the rate on existing loans, 
which remains at 9%, since the rate of 10% is 
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only applied to new loans obtained. When the 
rate is floating, however, a rise in it from 9% to 
10% means that the latter rate will be applied to 
the entire debt, and not only to the new debt 
contracted. Since nowadays practically 80% of 
the Latin American external debt is subject to 
floating interest rates, this means that a rise in 
the rate from 9% to 10% involves an extra ex-
pense of US$ 2 400 million for Latin America as 
a whole. 
In addition, however, the fact that the en-
tire debt is subject to floating interest rates con-
stitutes a new way for the international trans-
mission of imbalances. The traditional ways in 
which international imbalances are transmitted 
are very well known. When the United States is 
going through a recession, for example, the 
prices of commodity exports fall even though 
those of the developing countries' imports keep 
on rising, and the deterioration in the terms of 
trade means that we receive less for our exports, 
so that the imbalance is transmitted to our 
economy through the terms of trade. 
During a recession, the imports of the de-
veloped countries often go down, which means 
that our exports go down too. Thus, the effects 
of the international recession are also transfer-
red to our economies through the volume of ex-
ports. 
When the developed countries are apply-
ing a restrictive monetary policy, interest rates 
go up, and a higher rate of interest tends to 
bring about a reduction in investments in our 
countries, so that, because of the smaller expen-
diture brought about by high international in-
terest rates, this is another way in which part of 
the recession is transferred to our economies. 
When there is a recession in the United States, 
the exchange rate of the dollar improves with 
respect to other currencies, and as our curren-
cies are normally linked to the dollar this consti-
tutes a kind of revaluation through which inter-
national imbalances are also transmitted to our 
economies. 
Now, however, with the floating interest 
rates which affect the whole of the debt, there is 
a new and non-traditional way for the interna-
tional transmission of imbalances, namely, 
through movements in interest rates. When in-
terest rates rise in the United States because that 
country is applying a restrictive monetary pol-
icy, two things happen at once: the United 
States economy is slowed down, so that all the 
other traditional effects already mentioned take 
place, yet at the same time interest rates rise, 
thus directly increasing the interest payments 
on current account. Consequently, interest rates 
not only have an indirect effect through the 
spending of the economy, but also a direct effect 
through the current account imbalance caused 
by the need to make larger interest payments. 
4. Another new source of vulnerability 
Given the importance of the external debt and 
its level, there is another non-traditional 
mechanism for the transmission of international 
imbalances: deterioration in the portfolios of 
banks in the exterior. Let us suppose, for exam-
ple, that there is a recession in the United States; 
this leads to a deterioration in the portfolios of 
the banks of that country, so that they are much 
more reluctant to lend money and thus reduce 
the level of their loans. A country with a high 
level of indebtedness, however, has to pay high 
interest rates which it needs to finance, and it 
must renew its credits in order at least to keep 
up the level of its debt, yet it is precisely at this 
time that the banks become reluctant to lend, 
when interest rates are simultaneously rising be-
cause of the external recession. Thus, at one 
and the same time there is a deterioration in the 
terms of trade, all the other traditional ways of 
transmitting imbalances make themselves felt, 
and moreover the non-traditional methods of 
transmission of imbalances, which operate 
through the deterioration of the bank portfolios 
with consequent forced reduction of their lend-
ing activities, also come into action, leading to 
contraction in the international financial system. 
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V 
Is the present level of indebtedness sustainable? 
After looking at all these negative aspects, it 
would seem appropriate to analyse the question 
of whether the present level of indebtedness of 
Latin America can be sustained or not. I shall 
then suggest what could be done to deal with the 
situation. For the moment, however, it is worth 
stopping at this point to determine under what 
conditions the level of Latin American external 
indebtedness can be sustained. 
1. The growth rate of the world economy 
The first condition in order for this level to be 
sustainable is that the world economy should re-
cover, that is to say, that it should have a steady 
growth rate. Indeed, the National Security 
Council of the United States estimates that if the 
economies of the OECD countries grew at a rate 
of 4.2% per year, the problem of the external 
debt would be perfectly bearable for the debtor 
countries taken as a whole. Naturally, there are 
cases where the difficulties in doing so would be 
greater, but taking the countries as a whole, a 
sustained 4.2% growth rate by the OECD coun-
tries would make it possible to face up to this 
level of indebtedness because it would mean 
higher prices for exports, bigger exports for the 
debtor countries, lower interest rates, etc. 
2. The level of external real interest rates 
The second condition is that interest rates 
should go down in real terms to their traditional 
level. If we look at the last few decades in the 
United States and Europe, we see that real inter-
est rates were between 1% and 2%, with the ex-
ception of Japan, where real rates were higher 
because of the great productivity of that coun-
try's economy. Economies cannot resist long 
periods in which real interest rates are much 
over 1% or 2%, because in such an event the de-
positors in banks would be the owners of the en-
tire national wealth within the relatively short 
space of three or four generations; since interest 
keeps building up, after less than a century a 
million dollars would be turned into a thousand 
million dollars if the interest rate were 7% per 
year. Real interest rates, which were quite low in 
the past, are now of the order of 7%, which is 
an absolutely abnormal level. Thus, if the 
growth rate of the world economy were between 
4% and 5% and real external interest rates were 
more than 1% or 2%, the debt would be per-
fectly sustainable. 
3. Continuity in the flow of external credit 
A third condition is that the flow of bank credit 
should be relatively continuous and not inter-
rupted. Another problem arises here, because 
numerous banks which are relatively small by 
international standards have entered the field 
of international financing and are operating be-
hind the big banks or in conjunction with them. 
These small banks entered this field because 
there was great liquidity in the system and this 
enabled them to find a safety valve for their re-
sources, but they do not have the capacity to 
evaluate clients in other countries; they lack a 
team of experts who can maintain an updated 
view of the economies of other countries and of 
individual foreign clients, so that they have to 
rely on the judgement and criteria of the big 
banks. The small banks are also weak, however, 
and a small error in their portfolio can mean 
very serious difficulties for them, so that they go 
in together behind the big banks and also leave 
the field together at the first sign of difficulties. 
The big banks, which have their own teams for 
evaluating the situation, do not display such er-
ratic reactions, or at any rate would have fewer 
reasons to do so, whereas the smaller banks 
enter and leave the field en masse. This attitude 
causes difficulties with regard to the flow of 
bank credit resources, and in particular ít causes 
serious difficulties in the present renegotiation 
of the debt. The banking system shows a strong 
gregarious instinct, acting together one way or 
another. Thus, it acted in one direction between 
1975 and 1981, and in the opposite direction in 
1982. 
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4. The expansion of exports 
Another necessary condition is that there 
should be a steady expansion of the exports of 
debtor countries. If the economies of the other 
countries in the world are growing, this will en-
able exports to be expanded, but in order to do 
this it is necessary to have production capacity. 
In other words, it is necessary to have made in-
telligent use of the resources obtained through 
domestic saving and indebtedness. It cannot, 
however, be asserted that these resources have 
been intelligently used in all cases. In reality, 
when we look closely into the matter we find 
that in various cases external saving was used as 
a substitute for domestic saving instead of being 
a complement to it: that is to say, external saving 
led to a reduction of domestic saving. Invest-
ment did not grow as much as it should have 
done with these resources, so that not all coun-
tries are in a position to increase their exports, 
even if the world were to grow at a sufficient 
rate to absorb them. 
It is also necessary to take into account the 
marked protectionist trends observed in almost 
all countries of the world. Although govern-
ments try to resist protectionist pressures, the 
combination of unemployment and external im-
balances in the OECD countries causes these 
pressures to be successful. In recent years world 
trade has practically stagnated, and in reality for 
at least the past year world trade has been going 
down, in terms of both volume and prices, for 
the first time in a great many years. 
Unfortunately, protectionist tendencies in 
countries are not easy to reverse. Once estab-
lished, a series of vested interests are created in 
connection with them: those of the workers and 
owners of the enterprises receiving protection, 
the enterprises connected with them, the inter-
ests of the geographical areas where these are 
located, etc. This makes it very difficult to do 
away with protectionist measures once they have 
been adopted. 
5. Fulfilment of the conditions 
As a result of the world recession, these four 
conditions which are necessary in order for the 
external debt to be sustainable in a normal man-
ner are not being fulfilled. Unfortunately, the 
world economy is not growing, or else is only 
doing so very slowly. The gross national product 
of the industrialized countries as a whole, which 
grew by 1.3% in 1980 and 1.2% in 1981, shrank 
by 0.3% in 1982, and while in 1983 some growth 
is hoped for, this is at present nothing but a 
hope, so that it is clear that the world economy 
is not growing at the rate of 4% or 5% which 
would be needed in order to make the present 
level of indebtedness bearable. 
Furthermore, there has been an important 
change in the surplus/deficit distribution in the 
world. With the failure of the oil cartel, the oil-
exporting countries have ceased to register big 
surpluses; it will be recalled that they had ac-
cumulated almost US$ 500 billion in surpluses 
which they were mostly keeping on deposit in 
the banking system. Now, however, these coun-
tries have a deficit: the figures show that in 
1982, for example, the oil-exporting countries 
had a deficit of US$ 2 billion on their external 
accounts, and a deficit of US$ 27 billion is ex-
pected for 1983, so that these countries will no 
longer be making extra contributions to world 
liquidity. In 1982, the industrial countries regis-
tered a deficit of US$ 1 400 million, while the 
non-oil-exporting developing countries showed 
a deficit of US$ 87 billion. For 1983, the indus-
trial countries expect a surplus, thus changing 
the current account situation, but these coun-
tries are much less inclined than the oil-export-
ing countries to keep their resources in liquid 
form in the banks. It is therefore improbable 
that the latter can expect additional liquid re-
sources, and it is also consequently improbable 
that the international financial system will grow 
again at the rates at which it had been expand-
ing. Indeed, in the last few months of 1982, the 
international financial system showed a slight 
decline in its figures, instead of growth. 
As a result of the world recession (trade 
stagnation and protectionism were already re-
ferred to earlier), world trade declined in terms 
of volume by 2.5% in 1982, and by 4% in terms 
of unit values. It may be noted that up to 1981 
it had grown steadily. Real interest rates, for 
their part, have risen from 1% or 2% to around 
7%. 
In short, it is becoming increasingly diffi-
cult to export; real interest rates are rising in the 
exterior; and domestic and foreign bank 
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portfolios are deteriorating so that the supply of 
external credit is shrinking. One set of figures 
serves to illustrate the importance of several of 
these factors for the Latin American countries: 
if the terms of trade had kept the levels they had 
in 1965-1969 and interest rates had not varied 
from the average level of 1978, then the current 
account deficit of the 18 main Latin American 
non-oil-exporting countries would have gone 
down from the US$ 25 billion which it reached 
at the end of 1982 to only US$ 1 billion. Of 
course, if the terms of trade and interest rates 
A problem of the magnitude, scope and com-
plexity of the present one does not admit of sim-
ple or rapid solutions. On the contrary, it calls 
for action on various planes and for the adop-
tion of measures whose effects will take place at 
different moments in time. Any orderly solution 
of the problem of indebtedness calls, in the first 
place, for the adoption of certain emergency 
measures which will give time for the measures 
of a more definitive nature to come into effect. 
1. Emergency actions 
a) Renegotiation of the debt 
Many countries have initiated action de-
signed to reprogramme, refinance or re-
negotiate (however one wishes to call it) their 
commitments in respect of the external debt 
which fall due in the next twelve months or two 
years. Through such action, in agreement with 
creditors, it is hoped to reduce the amortization 
burden on the balance of payments during the 
next year or two years. It is spread out over the 
future, with some period of grace, because it is 
expected that the conditions of the national and 
world economy will be more favourable in the 
years to come. 
The first experiences of renegotiation 
show a marked increase in the cost of the re-
negotiated debt. This increase is based on the 
had been different, then many other things 
would have been different too. This calculation 
at least gives us an order of magnitude by which 
to appreciate the importance of the figures in-
volved, however. 
This set of factors means that, because of 
its form, maturities and amounts of interest pay-
ments, the present level of indebtedness is not 
sustainable and demands priority attention on 
the part of Ministers of Finance and Presidents 
of Central Banks. 
argument that the risk for the creditor has in-
creased. In reality, however, it may be asserted 
that such risk has perhaps even gone down, 
since the renegotiations have been accompanied 
by sharp increases in the guarantees provided 
by the debtor countries, at the demand of the 
creditor institutions. Furthermore, the real op-
tion which the creditor has is not the choice be-
tween obtaining punctual payment or renegotia-
ting, but rather the choice between renegotiating 
or not collecting the amounts due at all. This sit-
uation is not due to the ill will of the debtors, but 
to the material impossibility of paying in the 
manner originally agreed. The initial cost of the 
credit already included a certain 'risk premium', 
in line with the normal conditions of the credit 
market. Consequently, when the risk 
materializes the debtors should content them-
selves with the premium which has already been 
paid, and not increase the cost of the credit still 
further with higher spreads, flat surcharges, etc. 
The renegotiation will lead the creditor 
banks to take a great interest in the domestic 
policies of the country concerned, because it is 
important for them to know whether such poli-
cies will ensure that the debt can eventually be 
paid off promptly on normal terms. This is 
where the real restrictions on domestic policies 
appear when the debt is large, as already noted. 
It is worth adding that in normal relations be-
tween debtors and creditors, when the former 
VI 
How is the problem to be faced? 
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cannot pay their debts as scheduled an agree-
ment is reached which lightens the burden of 
the debt for the debtor, thus sharing the prob-
lem with the creditor. In the present cir-
cumstances there is no machinery for achieving 
such an objective, although such machinery 
existed in the past, before the Second World 
War, when most of the external debt took the 
form of bonds sold on the London and New 
York markets. If the debtors ran into difficul-
ties, the price of the bonds fell and the debtors 
could buy back the bonds they had issued (i.e., 
their debt) at a fraction of their original value, 
so that the burden of the debt was shared be-
tween creditors and debtors. Bank portfolios, 
however, cannot easily be bought and sold on 
the market, and this type of machinery for shar-
ing the burden of the debt has consequently dis-
appeared. 
In short, renegotiation is the first 
emergency action to be taken, but it should be 
subject to a warning: neither creditors nor 
debtors should take an exaggerated attitude as 
regards the cost of the debt. 
b) Expansion of the resources of the International 
Monetary Fund and the need for an even-
handed attitude by it to both creditors and 
debtors 
A second type of emergency action consists 
of the expansion of the International Monetary 
Fund, which has just increased its regular re-
sources by 47.5%, representing the addition of 
some US$ 15 billion to the resources which it 
has available for lending. This sum, however, is 
insignificant compared with the magnitude of 
the problem, so that if the Fund does not act in 
other ways also, it will very soon find itself with-
out resources once again. The International 
Monetary Fund is an absolutely essential institu-
tion in this process, and in my opinion it has 
played a key role in completing or helping to 
complete the renegotiations which have been ef-
fected so far. The Managing Director of the 
Fund has personally seen to it that the banks 
agree to assemble the additional resources 
needed to make up what each country requires 
to finance its needs. 
This situation means that the Fund must 
take into account the fact that there are limits to 
the policies which a country can adopt in order 
to make its programme acceptable. Here, there 
is a certain bias in the situation: in the present 
circumstances I consider that the Fund is not in 
a position to apply the same pressure to creditor 
countries as to debtors, so that there is a reces-
sive bias ín the Fund's policy. If it could apply 
the same pressure to creditor countries, it would 
tell them that they must apply expansive policies 
in order to make the world economy grow and 
permit an increase in the trade of the develop-
ing countries, especially Latin America. If this 
could be done, the burden of adjusting the 
Latin American economy to the new situation 
would be considerably lightened. In my per-
sonal opinion, the International Monetary Fund 
needs to seek extra resources quickly and to find 
some system which will enable it to exert pres-
sure on the creditor countries in the same way 
that it exerts it on debtors. I consider that much 
still remains to be done in this respect. 
c) The growth of world liquidity 
When we look at the Figures, we see that 
the world's international reserves are going 
down. In the case of Latin America, its gross re-
serves went down by US$ 12 billion in a little 
over one year, without counting the changes in 
the price of gold. The world as a whole has lost 
an even larger sum and continues to lose re-
serves, so that a substantial additional allocation 
of Special Drawing Rights would be justified 
from every point of view. These Rights were 
created precisely in order to supplement inter-
national liquidity at a time when the other 
sources of liquidity were not capable of satisfy-
ing requirements. Today they are clearly not 
capable of doing so either, and in my opinion 
there is therefore every justification for issuing 
Special Drawing Rights. The argument origi-
nally given for not continuing to issue them was 
that the banking system was growing so rapidly 
that it could take care of all financing needs, but 
this is no longer the case. The growth of the 
banking system has been paralysed, and there 
therefore does not seem to be any convincing 
argument against an additional allocation of 
Special Drawing Rights. 
This would solve many problems. Firstly, it 
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would raise the level of world liquidity to sup-
port the continued expansion of trade; sec-
ondly, it would tend to redistribute the debt 
payment burden since, to the extent that a coun-
try receives as a 'gift' a certain amount of re-
sources, it is being permitted to transfer fewer 
real resources in order to pay its external debt. 
Furthermore, it is my understanding that in-
creasing the amount of Special Drawing Rights 
does nor require special legislation in any coun-
try, including the United States, where it does 
not even need to be submitted to Congress, as is 
required in the case of an increase in the Inter-
national Monetary Fund quotas. 
It is well worth supporting the studies 
which are being embarked upon at this moment 
in the Fund to consider the possibility of making 
a fresh issue of Special Drawing Rights. 
2. Medium-term solutions 
a) At the national level 
Let us now look at the medium-term solu-
tions and the panorama offered by the future. 
These medium-term solutions call for action at 
both the national and the regional and interna-
tional levels. 
At the national level, I consider that the 
coming year will witness policies aimed at pro-
moting the growth of exports and import sub-
stitution. This is one way of assigning more re-
sources to the so-called tradeable goods sector 
and thus accumulating greater resources for re-
ducing the debt in relative terms. In reality the 
objective should not necessarily be to reduce the 
level of the debt in absolute terms, but an effort 
should be made to reduce it as regards its rela-
tive magnitude with respect to exports and the 
national product, which are the indicators most 
commonly used in this respect. 
b) At the regional level 
A second element which will probably 
make its appearance in national policies will be 
the use as far as possible of the regional markets 
and the regional and subregional integration 
agreements. This represents a still unexplored 
field which could be used for the common bene-
fit of all the countries. In order to do this, it will 
be necessary to strengthen the regional co-oper-
ation machinery in both its trade and financial 
aspects. This topic is quite well known and has 
been studied by various bodies, so that it is not 
appropriate to consider it in detail here. 
Moreover, there is evidence that some subre-
gional bodies are already acting in this direction. 
At the regional level, a further expansion 
of the Inter-American Development Bank, its 
regular capital and its additional funds would be 
particularly important. There are some difficul-
ties standing in the way of expanding the regu-
lar capital of the Bank, but it is to be hoped that 
these will be overcome and that the countries 
which have encountered problems in this re-
spect will be able to eliminate the restrictions 
limiting its growth. 
c) At the international level 
At the international level, I believe that the 
expansion of the International Monetary Fund 
would be an extremely favourable element, pro-
vided that this expansion was much greater 
than recently agreed upon: US$ 15 billion is a 
drop in the ocean compared with the present fi-
nancial difficulties; probably the size of the 
Fund ought to be doubled, or more than dou-
bled, yet so far it is only being increased by 
47.5%. 
The expansion of the World Bank would 
also be very favourable, provided that the Bank 
eliminates or ceases to apply a principle which it 
has been using in recent years: namely, the 
'principle of graduality' whereby, in proportion 
as the per capita income of a country rises, that 
country ceases to be eligible for obtaining World 
Bank loans. 
One of the important elements for the fu-
ture is that there should be a change in the com-
position of the external liabilities of the coun-
tries. In other words, instead of having so much 
debt from private sources, as they do now, the 
countries should have more external investment 
and less external debt, while there should be rel-
atively more debt from official sources and con-
sequently less from private sources. An external 
liability structure in which there is relatively 
more investment and loans from official sources 
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offers much greater stability for the total finan-
cial resources and the total portfolio of external 
liabilities of the countries. Changes in interest 
rates would not then affect them so much, since 
official loans normally carry a fixed interest 
rate, and a problem of instability would thus be 
relieved. At the same time, foreign investment 
should behave in keeping with the economic cy-
cles, that is to say, when a country suffers 
economic difficulties it should not have to pay 
profits to the exterior. Thus, remittances of 
profits on investments would be smaller when 
the economic situation was unfavourable, and 
greater when it was favourable, or at least incen-
tives could be established to encourage this ap-
proach, which would help to relieve the external 
financing problem instead of complicating it. 
3. New instruments for co-operation 
Generally speaking, probably what is needed 
are not new institutions for co-operation, but 
merely new instruments for it. In this respect, I 
should like to mention first of all the question of 
exchange systems. It would be desirable that ex-
change rates should not float as much as they do 
now, but should be more 'viscous' as Giscard 
D'Estaign called them or 'guided* as Carlos San-
guinetti suggested. These two terms imply an ex-
change system which does not fluctuate sharp-
ly or erratically in the world but has some de-
gree of inertia, so that these fluctuations do not 
discourage the allocation of resources to ac-
tivities connected with international trade. 
In the case of Latin America, consider-
ation could be given to new instruments of co-
operation such as the possibility of establishing a 
common unit of account for the payment of ser-
vices. Let as assume that the countries agree to 
establish a unit of account with a well-defined 
physical existence with which they could make 
their payments in respect of tourism, for exam-
ple, with these payments being settled among 
the countries at the end of a certain length of 
time. Each country would issue its own units of 
account, and each one would treat them as 
though they were foreign exchange, subject to 
the same restrictions and regulations. At the 
end of a certain length of time, such as three or 
six months, there would be a settlement of ac-
counts in respect of these resources and only the 
outstanding differences would be paid in for-
eign exchange. This could save a really consid-
erable volume of foreign exchange resources 
and consequently relieve the pressure on the re-
serves. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to exchange 
financial information, for the countries know 
little or nothing about what is happening in 
other countries. The result of this is, for exam-
ple, that at a given moment a country decides to 
come on the market with a bond issue on the 
same day that this is being done by another 
country, thus causing a drop in the price of the 
bonds and an increase in the cost for the issuer. 
If they had exchanged information they would 
simply have come to an agreement not to come 
on to the market at the same time. The manner 
of negotiation or renegotiation with the exterior 
could also be known by the countries, so that 
after a prior exchange of information they can 
each negotiate their own situation with fuller 
knowledge of the circumstances. Thus, some 
formula for the exchange of information could 
be extremely useful for all. Thought could also 
be given to the possibility of coming on to exter-
nal markets not as individual banks, but perhaps 
as multinational enterprises. Why not form mul-
tinational enterprises in the financial field which 
can come on to international financial markets 
in that form instead of doing so, as happens at 
present, as individual banks which have much 
less capital, much less backing and run much 
greater risks because they are linked to the fate 
of a single country? In contrast, if multinational 
enterprises were formed, they would have be-
hind them a group of countries which could di-
versify the risk much better. 
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VII 
The future prospects 
After taking due account of the nature of the 
possible short and medium-term solutions, I 
consider that in looking forward to the future 
we must have in mind one important concept: 
austerity. I have the impression that, in view of 
our level of imbalance, our level of indebtedness 
and the likelihood of a slow recovery of the 
world economy, our countries must necessarily 
look forward to a period of austerity. The way 
out of this problem will not be rapid, but slow 
and difficult. It is necessary to increase domestic 
saving, and in order to do this public and pri-
vate consumption must suffer, in order to leave 
a margin for the growth of production in the 
area of tradeable goods and take advantage of 
the prospects of an eventual recovery of the 
world economy. The need for efficiency in the 
allocation of resources and in the social evalua-
tion of projects will, I believe, become quite 
painfully evident. The more difficulties there 
are in a family, the greater care is exercised in 
the use of resources, and the same occurs with 
an enterprise or a country. This implies obliga-
tions and responsibilities not only for the gov-
ernment but also for each and every one of the 
citizens. 
Finally, more austerity also calls for great 
concern to ensure the social distribution of the 
burden. If austerity and demands for effort and 
sacrifice are imposed in a manner which lacks 
equity, they will not be sustainable: they could 
be maintained for six months or a year, but fi-
nally the countries would not accept a type of 
austerity which only affects some citizens but 
not all. 
In the final analysis, however, I am op-
timistic. Latin America has gone through diffi-
cult times in the past; we may recall that this is 
not the first crisis faced by the world economy. 
There was another very great crisis in the 1930s, 
and although it is true that the circumstances 
were different, that crisis left some lessons for 
us. It began at the end of 1929, yet in 1939, at 
the beginning of the war, unemployment in the 
industrialized countries was still very great. In 
1941, when the United States entered the war, 
unemployment in that country was still running 
at 14% of the labour force although ten years 
had passed by then. We have learnt more now 
than we knew then, and we have other institu-
tions, so that it will not be ten years this time, but 
even so the time needed to emerge from this 
problem must be reckoned in years rather than 
months. 
Fortunately, signs of recovery of the world 
economy are already to be glimpsed. They are 
neither very marked nor very brilliant or 
dramatic, but they are nevertheless there. Order 
books are growing in the United States, stocks 
are dropping and have probably reached their 
lowest level, while housing construction is begin-
ning to show some recovery. These are positive 
symptoms: of course they do not herald an easy 
or triumphant outcome, but they do represent 
an incentive for setting about the inevitable task 
of austere and equitable sacrifice so necessary 
for supporting us in our present difficulties. 
